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International Institutions and Platform-Mediated
Misinformation
Aziz Z. Huq*

Abstract
The Essay is part of a Symposium on Tom Ginsburg’s insightful book Democracies
and International Law. It explores one particular kind of interaction between democratic
nation states and international instruments and institutions: how international law and
institutions either mitigate or exacerbate harms to democracy from the diffusion of misinformation
and hate speech on social-media platforms. I identify three distinct pathways not covered by
Ginsburg: (a) international law as an off-the-rack legal regime for content-moderation by such
platforms; (b) international contouring of feasible domestic regulation; and (c) ex ante and ex
post international regulation of platform-mediated misinformation. Reflection upon these
pathways confirms some of Ginsburg’s insights, but also complicates other parts of his analysis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tom Ginsburg’s excellent book Democracies and International Law provides a
careful, multifaceted account of how democratic nation states and international
instruments and institutions interact.1 This brief response Essay takes up just one
thread in the book’s comprehensive tapestry. A pressing worry in contemporary
democracies is the effect of social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube on the quality of democratic debate. Many complain that platformmediated misinformation and hate speech damage the democratic practice of
public debate. They are also said to undermine dispositions of truthfulness and
mutual trust. All these necessary predicates to democratic stability are said to be
at risk due to misinformation of both domestic and foreign origin. I consider here
whether international law or institutions provide resources for mitigating (or
perhaps exacerbating) these harms. I flag three such mechanisms that Ginsburg
does not discuss, but pick up on his attention to the elements of the international
legal order that are likely to be most consequential for national democracies. A
thread running through Democracies and International Law is the role of regional
bodies (e.g., the African Court and the European Union) in fostering conditions
conducive to democratic survival.2 I suggest that the same holds true in the digital
space.
In his book and in the follow-up paper in this symposium, Ginsburg
discusses the international regulation of social-media platforms solely in reference
to the idea of “authoritarian international law.”3 He highlights the Draft United
Nations Convention on Cooperation in Combating Cybercrime as an example of
international institutions being deployed by nondemocratic states to promote
(antidemocratic) norms of “sovereignty and noninterference.”4 I find this example
a bit ambiguous. Ginsburg himself notes that democratic states were divided on
whether this instrument should come into force.5 Such a division within
democratic ranks at least leaves open the possibility that the draft convention
would provide some insulation for national jurisdictions seeking to influence
internet usage within their borders in ways consistent with democracy. Hence,
while his example provides a tantalizing glimpse of the possible mediating role of
international law and institutions in the internet domain, it also invites further
1

TOM GINSBURG, DEMOCRACIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2021).

2

4

See id. at 144–73 (discussing regional bodies in Africa and Europe).
See id. at 225–29; see also Tom Ginsburg, Democracies and International Law: An Update, 23 CHI. J. INT’L
L. X (2022).
GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 227–28 (discussing GA Res. 72/12, Draft United Nations Convention
on
Cooperation
in
Combatting
Cybercrime,
Oct.
16,
2017,
at
https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FC.3%2F72%2F12&Language=E&Devic
eType=Desktop&LangRequested=False (last visited Apr. 24, 2022)).

5

See id. at 227.

3
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exploration of the international space as an arena for the push and pull of
democratic backsliding.
II. DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL MEDIA
Democracy of a national scope, it is commonly assumed, requires “the
relatively free ability to organize and offer policy proposals, criticize leaders, and
demonstrate in public without official intimidation.”6 Social-media platforms are
relevant to democratic health because of their role in facilitating such public
debate. A significant fraction of Americans, for example, obtain news from
platforms such as Facebook (thirty-one percent) and YouTube (twenty-two
percent).7
Because of the decentralized and porous access rules for many platforms,
their use as critical elements of the public sphere creates the potential for
deliberately engineered falsehoods being intentionally disseminated to alter beliefs
pertinent to democratic choice—call this misinformation.8 One study of the 2016
election period estimated that Americans shared items of online misinformation
some 38 million times, saw on average one or more such items during the election
season, and believed such items roughly half of the time. 9 Pace First Amendment
folklore, lies diffuse faster than truths.10 And they can be produced at an industrial
pace and scale.11 While the volume of online misinformation varies over time,12
and while its effect on specific election results is at best unproven, 13 the
phenomenon of platform-mediated misinformation remains a potent source of
6
7

8
9

10

11

12

13

TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 11 (2018).
News Consumption Across Social Media in 2021, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 21, 2021),
https://perma.cc/Y3LY-7NT3.
I avoid the more ideologically loaded term “fake news.”
Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON.
PERSP. 211, 211–12 (2017); see also R. Kelly Garrett, Social Media’s Contribution to Political Misperceptions
in U.S. Presidential Elections, 43 PLOS ONE 1, 1–2 (Mar. 27, 2019).
Perhaps by four orders of magnitude. Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, The Spread of True
and False News Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146, 1146 (2018). This fallacy in “the marketplace of ideas”
rhetoric is occasionally rediscovered or re-proved but is an old point. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, On
Hating and Despising Philosophy, LONDON REV. BOOKS (Apr. 18, 1996), https://perma.cc/9N6XXV7A.
See, e.g., Darren L. Linvill & Patrick L. Warren, Troll Factories: Manufacturing Specialized Disinformation
on Twitter, 37 POL. COMM’N 447 (2020).
See Hunt Allcott, Matthew Gentzkow & Chuan Yu, Trends in the Diffusion of Misinformation on Social
Media, 6 RES. & POL. 1, 2 (2019) (charting decrease in misinformation on Facebook after 2016, but
not Twitter).
See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS & HAL ROBERTS, N ETWORK PROPAGANDA:
MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2018) (casting
doubt on the claim that the outcome of the 2016 presidential election was influenced by Russian
misinformation).
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concern at a historical moment in which democratic norms appear to be more
generally vulnerable.14 The worry is sharpened by evidence that foreign actors, and
in particular Russia, have invested in misinformation for their own geopolitical
ends.15
A related worry is platform-mediated hate speech. This is “bias-motivated,
hostile, and malicious language targeted at a group or person because of their
actual or perceived innate characteristics.”16 Content of this ilk tends to
disseminate “faster, farther, and reach a much wider audience as compared to the
content generated by users who do not produce hate speech.”17 It has the potential
to play a “powerful” role in stimulating “mass hate” that poses a threat to
democratic stability.18 Consider one example: in the twenty-four hours after a man
murdered fifty attendees at the Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand,
in March 2019, the video from his GoPro camera live streaming the killings had
been uploaded some 1.5 million times on Facebook.19 The social network has also
been criticized for the way in which it facilitates political violence in ethnically
divided societies, such as Myanmar.20
I think there is some reason to be cautious about how grave a threat to
democracy is posed by platform-mediated misinformation in isolation. When one
reads about Russian misinformation and trolling, it is hard to shake the sense that
Putin’s real offense here is not election-meddling so much as it is stealing a tool
from American foreign policy. As Ginsburg drily notes, the U.S. has long engaged
in its fair share of foreign election manipulation.21 Democracies, no less than
autocracies, can present a threat to other democratic regimes, especially when their
hegemony is at issue. Whether or not one agrees with President Obama’s assertion
14

15

Cf. INT’L IDEA, GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY REPORT 2021 (2021), https://perma.cc/C25RUPE4 (finding that “the United States, the bastion of global democracy, fell victim to authoritarian
tendencies itself, and was knocked down a significant number of steps on the democratic scale”).
See, e.g., Scott Shane, These Are the Ads Russia Bought on Facebook in 2016, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://perma.cc/KF7T-9PW6; Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/DH32-UNGR; Peter Pomerantsev, Authoritarianism Goes
Global (II): The Kremlin’s Information War, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 40 (2015). On the role of China, see
Anne Marie Brady, Authoritarianism Goes Global (II): China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine, 26(4) J.
DEMOCRACY 51, 51–59 (2015). For a broad reading of the evidence concerning China and Russia,
see DAVID SLOSS, TYRANTS ON TWITTER: PROTECTING DEMOCRACIES FROM INFORMATION
WARFARE 5-112 (2022).

20

Alexandra A. Siegel, Online Hate Speech, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: THE STATE OF THE
FIELD, PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 56, 57 (Nathaniel Persily & Joshua Tucker eds. 2020).
Id. at 63.
Id. at 70.
Robert Gorwa, Reuben Binns, & Christian Katzenbach, Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and
Political Challenges in the Automation of Platform Governance, 7 BIG DATA & SOC. 1, 1–2 (2020).
See sources cited infra in notes 66–68.

21

See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 227.

16

17
18
19
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that Russian misinformation had violated “established international norms of
behavior” in 2016,22 it is hard to find anything unprecedented in their
extraterritorial ambition.
Moreover, much anxiety about platform-mediated misinformation seems to
imagine a previous era in which Americans were fully informed, disabused of
falsehoods and biases, and hence capable of exercising rational, democratic
judgment. Of course, no such era ever existed. Democracy has always had an
uneasy relation to the social practices of truth-production.23 As recently as a halfcentury ago, a small number of major television networks and national newspapers
determined the framing of current events for most Americans. Conspiracy
theories, animus-driven bile, and general bunkum can be found aplenty
throughout American history.24 So when I take concerns about platform-mediated
misinformation seriously here, I should not be understood to be endorsing an
ahistorical, sanitized morality tale about American democracy’s fall from Edenic
epistemic grace.25

III. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN
PLATFORM MODERATION
What, then, is the role that international law and institutions play in
moderating or enhancing risks of platform-mediated misinformation and hate? I
think it is important to follow Ginsburg by not assuming that there is one and
only one way in which national democracies and international institutions can
interact. The vectors might be many, cross-cutting, and in conflict.

22

23
24

25

David E. Sanger, Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://perma.cc/B5HX-XWKF.
See generally SOPHIA ROSENFELD, DEMOCRACY AND TRUTH (2018).
Indeed, all the way to the founding. See generally Gordon S. Wood, Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style:
Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century, 39 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 402 (1982).
The role of social media in propagating hate speech linked to either discrete or generalized forms
of violence raises quite different ethical questions from misinformation. It is true that previous
modes of mass communication have played a role in earlier genocides—the use of radio in Rwanda
in 1994 is an example—and we cannot be certain that a pre-internet technology would not have
had much the same effect as Facebook in the Myanmar case. Yet our tolerance for ethnic or
religious violence should, in my view, be far lower than our tolerance for incremental derogations
of democracy. And just as earlier technologies are hedged around by regulatory safeguards against
abuse, so too it might be appropriate to criticize Facebook not so much because it facilitated
genocide, but rather because it failed to establish available and feasible precautionary measures to
mitigate that facilitation.
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A. International Law as Off -the-Rack Rules for Content
Moderation
A first possibility is that international law might provide an off-the-rack set
of rules for platforms’ content moderation systems. A content moderation system
is an “editorial guide sheet”26 or a “system of prior restraints”27 (the choice of
terms indexing an embedded moral judgment) that determines what can be posted
or shared on a platform.28 It is calibrated by a platform, not by a state. U.N. Special
Rapporteur On the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, David Kaye, has suggested that international
instruments defining human rights be used as a common source for contentmoderation norms by platforms acting on their own recognizance.29 Whereas legal
norms of speech regulation vary between national jurisdictions, international
human rights law on protected speech and unprotected speech (e.g. hate speech)
provides a purportedly general, widely accepted set of norms that platforms could
adopt as “rules of the road” for platform usage. These rules would have the
advantage of broad sociological and elite legitimacy and might offer moral leverage
to platform employees who wish to push their employer toward a better managed
site. Because a single content regulation norm is cheaper and easier for a platform
than a plurality, major companies also benefit from standardization. Indeed, some
have endorsed a version of Kaye’s proposal.30
Yet there are drawbacks too. In a careful analysis, Evelyn Douek has argued
that human rights norms are too vague and susceptible to manipulation to play
the role of global standards but nevertheless may offer an “intrinsically valuable”
decision protocol.31 She worries too that platforms will likely “co-opt[] the
language of [human rights] without any substantial changes in operations.”32 Less
powerfully, she contends that platforms such as Facebook lack necessary

26

27
28

29

30

31

32

Olivia Solon, To Censor or Sanction Extreme Content? Either Way, Facebook Can’t Win, GUARDIAN (May
23, 2017), https://perma.cc/R2R6-DQVM.
Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1359–60 (2018).
The most comprehensive account remains TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET:
PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA
(2018).
See David Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, 44–48, 70–72 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35. (Apr.
6,
2018),
https://perma.cc/QTD9-KGLL.
See, e.g., Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Aug. 10, 2018, 9:58 AM), https://twitter.com/jack/status
/1027962500438843397; Monika Bickert, Updating the Values That Inform Our Community Standards,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/3K3K-TF2U.
Evelyn Douek, The Limits of International Law in Content Moderation, 6 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L
TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. 37, 53–54, 63 (2021).
Id. at 59.
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information to apply those norms.33 (Surely, Facebook could certainly hire people
to implement these norms?) At the same time, Douek is correct that international
law is underspecified in relation to the large and heterogenous array of unsettled
questions raised by content moderation. That said, the relevant question is not
whether such ambiguity exists. It is rather whether human rights law is more or
less ambiguous than other potential off-the-rack rules for content moderation. It
seems plausible that the combination of cross-national generality, which tends to
lower platforms’ operating costs, coupled with the fact that there is a similarly
general normative framework of comparable sociological legitimacy, makes
human rights law more attractive than Douek allows. Moreover, to the extent
there are gaps, the cost of filling them will turn on the technical capacity of
automated learning instruments that use reinforcement learning to refine and
temper rules.34
To my mind, Douek’s insightful treatment omits two important reasons for
hesitation about human rights norms. First, there is a worry that international law
norms may be substantively undesirable. Ginsburg’s discussion of religious
defamation norms in international law captures this worry.35 Second, Ginsburg’s
analysis of authoritarian international law suggests that, contrary to Douek’s
assumptions, human rights law should not be assumed to be static. The worry
here is that once content moderation is hitched to human rights, there is a new,
potentially powerful incentive to capture the bodies that generate such law. The
quality of its substance would therefore be inversely correlated with its utility.
If there is reason for optimism about the content of human rights law as a
template for content moderation, it might arise from a different logic. Many
scholars have noted, often with alarm, that platforms engage in “a form of private
governance that reaches across geographic borders.”36 In a 2017 speech, the
General Counsel of Microsoft proposed that platforms be understood as, in
effect, “digital Switzerlands.”37 As Kristen Eichensehr has explained in an
illuminating gloss on this idea, these firms claim to be “on par with, not
subordinate to, governments, including those governments that try to regulate
them” because they are “supplemental sovereigns, governing individuals alongside
states.”38 Eichensehr does not address the possibility that platforms might play a
33
34

35

36

37

38

See id. at 61.
For a skeptical view, see Tarleton Gillespie, Content Moderation, AI, and the Question of Scale, 7 BIG
DATA & SOC. 1, 2–3 (2020).
See GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 227; see also Lorenz Langer, The Rise (and Fall?) of Defamation of Religions,
35 YALE J. INT’L L. 257 (2010).
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance: Private Power in the Shadow of the State, 72 SMU L.
REV. 27, 31 (2019).
Brad Smith, President, Microsoft Corp., Keynote Address at the RSA Conference 2017: The Need for a
Digital Geneva Convention 12 (Feb. 14, 2017) (transcript available at https://perma.cc/GKB5-SCUF).
Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 668 (2019).
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role in the production and calibration of international law norms. She does note,
however, that there are forces that might induce public-regarding corporate
behavior. These include “[c]ompetitive pressures, corporate social responsibility
norms, evolving industry standards, and threats of targeted regulation.”39 Her
analysis thus homes in upon the right question: whether selfish, private incentives,
as thinkers from Bernard Mandeville and Adam Smith onward have urged, will
conduce to public goods—now in the international sphere.

B. International Contouring of Domestic Regulation
A second possibility is that the international environment provides
springboards (or walls) that could enable (or handicap) domestic efforts at
managing platform-mediated misinformation. Here, efforts to mitigate the latter
run through the state, rather than through the platform itself. Prior commitments
to international institutions then either expand or contract a democratic state’s
ability to encase its own democracy, or (alternatively) recalibrate a nondemocratic
state’s capacity to undermine other democratic regimes.
The positivist tenor of Ginsburg’s analysis suggests that any such effect will
not depend simply on the presence of a conflict between national regulation and
an international norm.40 Following his lead, I ask here whether and how
international law and institutions will bite—an inquiry that, as Ginsburg suggests,
leads us toward regional bodies. One avenue for such influence is the effect of
European rules concerning extraterritorial jurisdiction. It is now common for
states to demand the removal of content that violates international law from
online forums.41 The efficacy of such orders can depend on the mediating role of
international bodies. In 2019, for example, the European Court of Justice ruled
that member states have authority to order platforms to remove content globally.42
The Court, however, has also distinguished between permissible injunctions to
prevent specific violations and unlawful general bans either targeting all content

39

40

41
42

Id. at 727; see also Barrie Sander, Democratic Disruption in the Age of Social Media: Between Marketized and
Structural Conceptions of Human Rights Law, 32 EUR. J. INT’L L. 159, 162 (2021) (expressing skepticism
of “market friendly” understandings of human rights law).
See, e.g., Sander, supra note 39, at 168 (arguing that “blanket bans of disinformation or untruthful
expression generally lack sufficient precision to be compatible with the legality test under Article
19(3) of the ICCPR and also fall foul of the necessity test”).
See Andrew Keane Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328, 340 (2018).
See Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 53 (Oct.
3, 2019) (“[A]rticle 15(1) [of directive 2000/31], must be interpreted as meaning that it does not
preclude a court of a Member State from . . . ordering a host provider to remove information . . .
worldwide within the framework of the relevant international law.”); see also Adam Satariano,
Facebook Can Be Forced to Delete Content Worldwide, E.U.’s Top Court Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://perma.cc/8QHZ-YX8D.
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or applying indiscriminately.43 Within these constraints, European law thus
imposes no final barrier to national defense of democratic values on platforms.
Subsequent interactions between national regulations and international
constraint might end differently. In 2018, for example, France enacted legislation
allowing specially expedited judicial proceedings, initiated by public authorities or
political parties, to halt the spread of online disinformation within three months
prior to elections.44 The European Court of Human Rights, however, has on
several earlier occasions invalidated summary election-related proceedings in the
non-digital context.45 These cases suggest that European law might provide
constraints on the operation of national mechanisms for protecting democracy.46
The effect of international action on these extraterritorial actions by states
will depend on the extent to a which a given government is able to “control the
Internet’s underlying hardware.”47 Even in democratic states, domestic actors
(including judges) can try to alter the terms on which data flows via platforms
from overseas. In Milton Mueller’s insightful terminology, they seek “greater
alignment between territorial states and the administrative units of the Internet.”48
And the greater the national influence over data flows, the less international law
and institutions will matter. 49

C. International
Misinformation

Regulation

of

Platform -mediated

The final pathway whereby international law might refract the risk to
democracies created by social platforms is, quite simply, through direct regulation.
An international body might directly inflict costs on a platform in ways that alter
the content of information flows on the site. This might be done through direct,
ex ante regulation, or alternatively might take the form of ex post penalties for
43

44

45

46
47
48

49

See C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, ECLI:EU:C:2011:771; C-360/10, Belgische
Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v. Netlog NV,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:85.
Loi 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de l’information [Law 2018-1202
of December 22, 2018 on the fight against the manipulation of information], JOURNAL OFFICIEL
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France] (Dec. 23, 2018)
https://perma.cc/4HJJ-B5TX.
For a summary, see Adam Krzywon, Summary Judicial Proceedings as a Measure for Electoral
Disinformation: Defining the European Standard, 22 GERMAN L.J. 673, 682–83 (2021).
Id. at 685–87 (discussing possible interactions).
Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 Geo. L.J. 317, 327 (2015).
MILTON MUELLER, WILL THE INTERNET FRAGMENT? 34 (2017). A famous case is the effort by a
Brazilian judge to ban WhatsApp. See Jonathan Watts, Judge Lifts WhatsApp Ban in Brazil After Ruling
Block Punished Users Unfairly, GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/HHS8-N824.
Cf. SLOSS, supra note 15, at 152–56 (proposing a new “Alliance for Democracy” that would
cooperate against coordinated misinformation campaigns).
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specific instances in which counter-democratic speech is transmitted. The
evidence of each of these possibilities is, to say the least, mixed at present. The
best one can do is to identify nascent possibilities, which intimate the prospect of
a more robust international role in the future.
Consider first ex ante regulation. Consistent with Ginsburg’s emphasis on
regional actors as key, it has been the European regional bodies that have led the
way here. Commentators canvassing the range of continent-wide initiatives hence
speak of “the rise of European digital constitutionalism.”50 In 2015, the European
Commission established the European Internet Forum, which produced a “Code
of Conduct on Countering Hate Speech Online.”51 Under the Code, platforms
agreed to proscribe speech that incited violence against protected groups, to
establish a twenty-four hour window for examining and removing speech, and to
allow periodic reviews by the European Commission to determine compliance.52
Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft agreed to the code and received critical
feedback on their responses in the first Commission compliance report.53 Some
commentators have suggested that even though the Code lacks legal force,
platforms will conform to prevent regulation from materializing.54 Further, they
predict that those platforms will “delete or block content . . . everywhere the
platform is viewed,” thereby damaging “global freedom of expression.”55
At least as of this writing, this concern does not appear to have materialized.
As of 2020, about half of the misogynistic and racist posts that violate Facebook’s
community standards are not taken down, even when they are reported to the
company.56 Despite the European Commission Code, the platform failed to
respond promptly or effectively to the Myanmar government’s efforts to use the
site to catalyze ethnic cleansing and perhaps genocide.57 Its chief executives also

50

51

52
53

54

55
56

57

Giovanni De Gregorio, The Rise of Digital Constitutionalism in the European Union, 19 INT’L J. CON. L.
41, 67 (2021).
European Commission Press Release IP/16/1937, European Commission and IT Companies
Announce Code of Conduct on Illegal Online Hate Speech (May 31, 2016),
https://perma.cc/Q4H2-LXJU.
See id.
See European COMM’N, CODE OF CONDUCT ON COUNTERING ILLEGAL HATE SPEECH ONLINE:
FIRST RESULTS ON IMPLEMENTATION 1 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/9VAJ-F6U8.
See Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1035, 1048 (2018).
Id. at 1055, 1058.
Caitlin Ring Carlson & Hayley Rousselle, Report and Repeat: Investigating Facebook’s Hate Speech Removal
Process, FIRST MONDAY (Jan. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/3LXZ-W8SJ.
See Jenny Domino, Crime as Cognitive Constraint: Facebook’s Role in Myanmar’s Incitement Landscape and
the Promise of International Tort Liability, 52 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 143, 182–83 (2020).
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resisted efforts to mitigate polarizing posts.58 The “economic incentive to promote
polarizing content that induces users to spend more time on the site”59 appears to
have outpaced any regulatory shadow. This is not to say that international efforts
to influence platform-mediated misinformation could not be effective (or even
excessively chilling). Rather, the evidence to date does not support the conclusion
that the European Commission’s approach has been effective, let alone that it has
induced a surfeit of caution.
In December 2020, the European Commission proposed a new Digital
Services Act.60 The proposed measure would take the form of a regulation, which
would allow member states limited room for deviation.61 It has been described as
“a harmonized EU system which replaces national ones in the scope of
application.”62 It would “impose a number of obligations on ‘very large online
platforms’ including transparency requirements for their recommender and
advertising systems, user controls over the main parameters of recommender
systems including at least one option that is not based on profiling, a data access
framework and independent audits to monitor compliance.”63 The Act, moreover,
would allow mandatory notice-and-takedown orders forcing platforms either to
remove illegal content, including racism and xenophobia, or face fines.64 However
impressive this all sounds, it remains to be seen how extensively the proposed
regulation would oust national efforts at controlling platform-mediated
misinformation and hate speech.65
Now consider the scenario of ex post, punitive regulation in an international
body. This is, unsurprisingly, a rather more remote possibility. In November 2019,
however, The Gambia lodged a case against Myanmar in the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) claiming a violation of the Genocide Convention.66 As previously
noted, The Gambia turned to U.S. courts in 2021, seeking to compel Facebook to
58

59
60
61

62
63
64

65

66

See Jeff Horwitz & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Executives Shut Down Efforts to Make the Site Less
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produce data related to Myanmar officials’ use of Facebook to stoke violence
against the Rohingya minority.67 While not a defendant in an international
proceeding, the social media platform was placed in the delicate position of having
to resist disclosures concerning its users on privacy grounds in the context of a
suit charging genocide. In September 2021, a magistrate judge in the District of
Columbia issued an order compelling Facebook to produce data on de-platformed
Myanmar officials who had posted anti-Rohingya content, reasoning that failing
to so do would “compound the tragedy that has befallen the Rohingya . . .
throwing away the opportunity to understand how disinformation begat genocide
of the Rohingya and would foreclose a reckoning at the ICJ.” 68 This order,
however, was overturned on appeal to the district court.69
It is worth asking whether The Gambia could pursue the same evidentiary
request in another jurisdiction. As Anupam Chander and Uyên Lê have explained,
a single database is not necessarily physically located in one place. Instead, its
“[data] rows . . . are held separately in servers across the world—making each
partition a ‘shard’ that provides enough data for operation.”70 So imagine if
Facebook stored the data sought by The Gambia in relation to its international
suit in a jurisdiction (or in several jurisdictions) other than the U.S. The availability
of that information would turn on statutory privacy and disclosure regimes that
might present different opportunities and barriers from the rather peculiar and
antiquated American iteration. More generally, the operation of the relevant
international law mechanism would turn potentially on the procedural intricacies
of domestic law.

IV. CONCLUSION
I have offered here a modest elaboration of one brief discussion in Democracy
and International Law. That even a single page of the book allows for such
elaboration is evidence of its intellectual fecundity. The page on which I drew is
embedded in a discussion of authoritarian international law, drawing out how the
international arrangements for controlling the internet’s basic structure might be
captured by authoritarian actors.71 I have aimed here to supplement this focus,
pointing out other mechanisms through which international law might bite on
67
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2021 WL 5758877 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2021)).
See id.
Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 719 (2015); see also Paul M.
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democratic survival. In so doing, I have underscored key themes of Democracy and
International Law: the central role of regional bodies as sources of both substantive
law and enforcement resources, the interaction of international bodies with
domestic bodies (in particular, courts), and the importance of situating law in its
institutional context.
At the same time, I think that a modest supplement to the analytic apparatus
of Democracy and International Law can also be discerned here. Ginsburg’s analysis
embraces a measure of realism but remains relatively state-centered. The rise of
transnational platforms capable of generating endogenously their own forms of
governance complicates this picture. Those platforms are not just shaped by the
ideologies and material opportunities of early-twentieth century democratic
capitalism. They exercise an autonomous influence on the flow of democratic
ideas and possibility of democratic endurance. If we want a more fulsome account
of how international law and institutions influence national democracies, we could
do worse than taking account of those platforms—not just as agents of
democratic erosion but as authors of international norms. We can recognize that
transnational platforms have as much effectual influence as states without having
to abandon the state-centered approach that Ginsburg masterfully takes.
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